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1. INTRODUCTION 
This document is an Overall Executive Summary of work 
accomplished from 1 September 1976 through 30 June 1977 on the seven 
Advanced Space Program Studies covered by NASA contract NASW-Z884. 
Table 1-1 lists the studies, their funding, The Aerospace Corporation 
MTS deliveries, and the names of the personnel responsible for managing 
and monitoring each individual effort. 
Table 1-1. Advanced Space Program Studies 
STUDY MANAGERS FUNDINGMs$ K MANSTUDY TITLE AEROSPACE NASA 	 MONTHS 
2. 	 1 Advanced Space Planning and Conceptual B. H. Campbell M. E. Goodhart JSC 206.3 31.0


Analysis F. S. Roberts Hq


Z.2 Shuttle UserStudies 	 E. I. Pritchard W. F. Moore Hq ZZ5.4 28.3 
Z,3 Technology Assessment and No. D. . Aviv S. R. Sadin Hq 120.0 18.0


Opportunsties


2.4 Standardization and Program Practice T. Shiokar M. L. Sprull q 313.4 48.1 
A. T. Diamond Hq 
Z.5 Integrated STS Operations Planning Study R. R. Wolfe J. M. Smith Hq 126.9 16.9 
Z. 6 Solid Spinning Upper Stage W. A. Knittle A. G. Orill.on MSFG 495.2 51.3 
J. W. Wild Hq 
Z.7 Integrated Planning Support Functions 1. Bekey R. W. Johnson Hq 99.9 7.7 
Total 	 1587.1 201.3 
The objectives of these' studies were to provide NASA with 
multidisciplined advanced planning studies that involved space operations 
and the associated system elements (including man), identification of 
potential low cost system approaches, vehicle design, cost synthesis 
techniques, technology forecasting and opportunities for DoD technology 
transfer, and the development of near-, mid-, and far-term space 
initiatives and development plans with emphasis on domestic and military 
use commonality. All of the studies involved consideration of both NASA 
and DoD requirements and planning data. 
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The Advanced Space Program Studies have been performed by 
The Aerospace Corporation since FY 1970, primarily for the NASA Office 
of Space Flight. In FY 1975 the support base was expanded to include 
the Low Cost Systems Office and the Office of Space Technology. 
Every attempt was made to integrate the studies. For instance, 
the selection of initiatives used in Study 2. 1 - Advanced Space Planning 
and Conceptual Analysis - was strongly influenced by the FY 76 work which 
preceded Study 2. 7 - Integrated Planning Support Functions. A primary 
objective of the Aerospace studies is to ensure integration of DoD and 
NASA activities wherever possible. Study 2. 3 - Technology Assessment and 
New Opportunities - proved to be very successful in furthering this objective, 
and the DoD data bank generated in this study has been widely disseminated 
and received with deep interest throughout the NASA user community. 
The operational management of STS will present a significant 
problem to which no clear solution is likely to become apparent. The 
unique decision-making techniques employed in Study 2.5 - Integrated STS 
Operations Planning - offer an attractive approach to resolving this very 
important issue. 
A particularly important contribution was made by Study 2. 6 -
Spinning Solid Upper Stage (SSUS) for Delta and Atlas/Centaur class missions. 
It was concluded that the SSUS concept is feasible and the study was able to 
be carried to such a depth of detail to permit bypassing a Phase A definition 
contract and direct committal to Phase B hardware development. 
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2. REPORTS ISSUED 
The results of the studies performed under Contract NASW-2884 
are documented in 
ATR-76(7371)-1 
ATR-76(7372-01)-l 
ATR-77(7372)-l 
ATR-77(7373-01)-1 
ATR-77(7373-0l)-1 
ATR-77f7373-02)-l 
ATR-77(7373-02)-2 
ATR-77(7629)-I 
ATR-76(7374-01)-l 
the following reports: 
Advanced Space Planning and 
Conceptual Analysis (Study 2. 1) 
Final Report 
Volume I - Executive Summary 
Volume II - Initiative Transporta­
tation Analysis 
Volume III - Assessment of Man 
in Space 
On-Orbit Checkout Study 
(Study 2. Z) Final Report 
Shuttle User Studies (Study 2.Z) 
Final Report, Executive Summary 
Spacelab Utility for DoD (Study 2.2) 
Final Report 
Spacelab Utility for DoD (Study Z. Z) 
Final Report, Appendix (Classified) 
STS Ancillary Equipment Study 
(Study Z. 2) Final Report 
STS Ancillary Equipment Study
(Study 2. 2) User Reference Book 
On-Orbit Checkout of Satellites 
(Study 2. Z) Final Report (Part Z 
of On-Orbit Checkout Study) 
Technology Assessment and 

Forecast (Study Z. 3) (Sensor 

portion only) 

15 April 1977 
13 January 1977 
30 June 1977 
30 June 1977 
30 June 1977 
30 June 1977 
30 June 1977 
30 June 1977 
13 October 1976 
Z-1


ATR-76(7374)-2 	 Technology Assessment and New 15 December 1976 
Opportunities (Study Z. 3) 
Final 'Repodt 
Volume I - Executive Summary 
Volume II, Part 1 - Strategic and 
Tactical Systems and 
Near-Term Technology 
Programs 
Volume II, Part 2 - Technology Assess­
ment for DoD Space 
Prog rams 
Volume II, Part 3 - Technology Assess­
ment for DoD Space 
Programs (cont'd) 
ATR-77(7375-01)-1 	 Standardization and Program 15 December 1976 
Practices Analysis (Study 2. 4) 
Final Report 
Volume I - Executive Summary 
Volume II, Part 1 - Program 
Practices Evaluation 
Volume II, Part 2 - Appendixes 
Volume III - Auxiliary Propulsion 
Components Compendium 
ATR-75(7364)-I, Volume IV - Equipment Compendium September 1976 
Revision 1 Part A. Stabilization and Control 
Subsystem 
Part C. Electrical Power Subsystem 
Part D. Communication and Data 
Processing 
ATR-76(7376)-I 	 Manned Earth Science Observations February 1976 
(Study 2.5)

ATR-76(7376)-Z Integrated STS Operations Planning 
(Study 2. 5) Final Report 
16 July 1976 
Volume I - Executive Summary 
STS Operational 
Management Concepts 
Volume II - STS Operational Manage­
ment Assessment 
Volume III - Phase 2 STS Operational 
Management Assessment 
Z-Z


ATR-76(7377-01)-1 Spinning Solid Upper Stage for 
Delta and Atlas/Centaur Class 
30 November 1976 
Missions (Study 2. 6) Final Report 
Volume I - Executive Summary 
Volume II - Technical Report 
Volume II - Appendix A 
Volume II - Appendix A Drawings 
ATR-77(7378)-I Integrated Planning Support 30 June 1977 
Functions (Study Z. 7) 
Final Report 
Volume I - Executive Summary 
Volume II - Study Report 
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3.1 
3. 	 ADVANCED SPACE PLANNING AND 
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (STUDY 2. 1) 
The Space Shuttle and the Interim Upper Stage (IUS) will support 
most space mission objectives through the early 1980s. However, a number 
of candidate payloads for the post-1985 -ra could exceed the expected capa­
bility, including any nominal uprating of the baseline STS. In this study, 
The Aerospace Corporation defined potential transportation requirements 
and operational modes for a selected group of space initiatives which are 
intended to represent NASA and DoD space programs for the period 1985-2000. 
OBJECTIVE 
The primary objective of this study was to define potential' 
transportation requirements and operational modes for the 1985-2000 time 
period and to construct project plans based on an evolutionary Space Trans­
portation System (STS); defining the associated vehicle elements and oper­
ational options required to support each of a number of selected initiatives. 
Further objectives were: to identify those functions that man could profitably 
perform in space; and to recommend areas being investigated by the DoD 
that should be evaluated by NASA. 
3. Z RESULTS 
The selected initiatives are listed in Table 3-1, together with 
the Outlook for Space themes which they represent. Payload weights range 
from 11, 360 to 1. 8 million kg; orbits range from 926 km to geosynchronous 
and also include L3. It was assumed that each initiative was independent of 
the other. A graphical portrayal of the transportation recommendations to 
support the NASA initiatives listed in Table 3-1 is given in Figure 3-1. The 
small Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV) weighs about 42, 200 kg; the large OTV 
weighs about 65, 000 kg. 
The study identified in a preliminary way.those functions which 
man could profitably perform in space. The conclusions are: 
"Outlook for Space, " NASA Report NASA SP-386, January 1976 
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a. Manned support for many of the initiatives will be needed. 
b. 	 Refurbishment and repair is cost effective. 
c. 	 Remote manipulators and robotics have limited capability 
but should be evaluated in greater depth. 
d. 	 Interactive man/machine systems have great potential. 
e. 	 Multipurpose missions appear inevitable. 
f. 	 Very sophisticated initiatives will require specialized 
crew complements. 
Table 3-1. 	 Relationship of Selected Payloads 
to 'Original NASA Initiatives 
Theme 01 	 Production and Management of Food and Fibre Resources 
- Advanced Resources/Pollution Observatory 
Theme 02 Prediction and Protection of the Environment 
- Synchronous Meteorological Satellite 
Theme 03 Protection of Life and Property 
- Nuclear Fuel Location 
- Fire Detection 
- Coastal Passive Radar 
Theme 04 Mineral Exploration and Energy 
- Nuclear Waste Disposal 
Theme 05 Transfer of Information 
- Personal Communications 
Theme 08, The Nature of the Universe, the Life Cycle of Stars, 
10, and It and Evolution of the Solar System 
- Large Telescope Facility 
Theme 1Z Origins and Future of Life 
- Interstellar Search System 
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3.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 
An area which should also be evaluated is that of manually­
controlled remote teleoperators, robotics, and software/hardware inter­
active command and control systems (artificial intelligence) which are being 
examined by the DoD. Studies should: 
a. 	 Assess the present and planned capabilities of these devices 
for the 1985-2000 time period 
b. 	 Determine the applicability of these devices to selected 
initiatives 
c. 	 Identify areas where development or modification could lead 
to significant improvements in operational capability. 
ALTITUDE 
GEOSYNC 
-S LARGE MANNED DIV 
LOW/LAB 	 / 	S 	 SOI
 
QI 
ORBIT 
SHUTTLE SHUTLE 	 HLLV2 STAGE 
GROUND I I I I i YEAR 
1975 1980 1985 199O 1995 2000 
Figure 3-1. Transportation System Plan 
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4. SHUTTLE USER STUDIES (STUDY Z. 2)


4.1 	 ON-ORBIT CHECKOUT STUDY 
Major decisions must be made before orbital separation of the 
payload, and 'heckout oh orbit is needed to make these decisions. Further­
more, checkout is needed: (1) during space servicing and resupply, (2) for 
checkout of zero-g devices, (3) to forestall the loss of a nonreturnable STS 
payload suffering early degradation or failure, (4) to avoid ground refurbish­
ment of returnable payloads when adjustment or repair in space is possible, 
(5) to avoid 	 an extra flight for retrieving a faulty returnable payload, and 
(6) 	 to decrease the elapsed time for satellite initiation. 
Several potential checkout modes were identified by The Aerospace 
Corporation. For example, checkout can be supported, controlled, and 
sequenced from the ground, either through the Orbiter communications 
system or by communicating directly with the payload. Alternatively, use 
can be made of on-board, in-flight, automated equipments. It seems ex­
pedient to support payload checkout with the same equipment used for factory 
and launch site testing and to utilize support equipment and software which 
could be applied to many STS users. The potential utility of the TDRS 
(Tracking and Data Relay Satellite) must also be considered. 
4.1.1 	 Objectiv 
The objective of this study was to investigate the feasibility and 
effectiveness of on-orbit checkout of advanced STS payloads. 
The feasibility of on-orbit checkout by equipment which remains 
attached to the Orbiter was considered, in addition to checkout by equipment 
at the payload operational control center. The study was restricted to con­
sideration of checkout at low altitude Shuttle orbits. 
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4.1.2 Results 
Data -wereobtained- on 18 candidate satellites which are repre­
sentative of the different types on which on-orbit checkout would be applicable. 
Three of these were selected for analysis: Technology Demonstration Satellite, 
Stormsat, and Synchronous Meteorological Satellite/GOES). The Technology 
Demonstration Satellite studied had an air quality instrument package and 
synthetic aperture radar mounted on a Multimission Modular Spacecraft 
[MMS, see Figure 4-1(a)]. The other two satellites are illustrated in 
Figure 4-1 (b) and (c). 
Tables 4-1, 4-2, and 4-3 show comparisons of on-orbit checkout 
costs per launch for the development, procurement, and use of on-orbit 
checkout equipment for the three selected examples. Three ground-based 
and three space-based test sequencing modes of operation were considered. 
In each case, RF tests made directly with the ground terminal are cost 
competitive with the other approaches. Ground-based test sequencing costs 
less than space-based test sequencing. 
4. 1.3 Conclusions 
Table 4-4 gives a summary of on-orbit checkout cost benefit 
data. The data show that on-orbit checkout of the Technology Demonstration 
Satellite (a low earth orbit satellite) is justified although cost benefits 
are modest at two to three hundred thousand dollars per launch. These 
benefits can increase substantially if either: (1) the Orbiter or avionics 
could support on-orbit checkout with a lower charge, or (2) some of the 
on-orbit checkout equipment replaces ground support equipment used for 
prelaunch checkout. Each of these alternatives is possible. 
On-orbit checkout of Stormsat (a synchronous equatorial orbit 
satellite) does not appear to be justified on a cost/benefit basis unless the 
upper stage is also checked out on orbit. This could prevent upper stage 
early failure and hence loss of the upper stage and the payload. 
On-orbit checkout of the SMS/GOES satellite does not appear 
to be justified on a cost/benefit basis unless: (1) the Shuttle parking orbit 
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Baseline Structure 	 (b) Stormsat Configuration(a) MMS 
(c) 	 SMS Spacecraft Configuration 
Figure 4-1. Candidate Payloads 
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Table 4-1. 	 TDS On-Orbit Checkout ?osts Per Launch, $M 
Equipment and Software (! 
Spaceborne Equipment 
General Special Ground ( z )Tests Purpose Purpose Equipment Software Total 
GROUND-BASED TEST 
SEQUENCING 
IF Tests4( ) Thru Checkout 0.432


Equ*prgnet/Spi acraft Link 0157 0.29 0 .5 (O.Z34)


)RF Tests" Thru.Orbiterl 0.157 .0. 0.021 0,125 0.303


Spacecraft RF Link (0.218)


RF Tests331 Direct With M-5 0.021 0.125 0,303


Ground Terminal (0.258)


SPACE-BASED TEST 
SEQUENCING 
RF Testsi 3 ) Then Checkout 01 007


Equipment/Spacecraft Link 0.234 0.120 0.019 0.125 OA.3


( 3 ) RF Tests Thru Orbiter/ 0.234 -0. 0.019 0. 15 0.378 
Spacecraft RI' Link (0.Z93) 
RF Tests 3 3 Direct With 0.Z34 
 
-0. 0.019 0.125 0.378 
Ground Terminal (O.Z93 
(I) Eq."pnint and softiare tan alsoi he applied to lintl, sie payload testing.


M2) Costs in pa rnhtacs assome' 8 1 DS iaitics ar,e lanched. paruntleses assume IhoutTDS
 
salellite latthca. (II rest .i'atelft 	 I II C F eq+wiciperit. 
Table 4-2. 	 Stormsat On-Orbit Chec ut Costs Per Launch(1), $M 
Equipment and Software'-" 
Spatceborne Equipment
Alternative Testing Concepts 
For General Special Ground 
On-Orlt Checkout Purpose Purpose Equipment Software Total 
GROUND-BASED TEST 
SEQUENCING 
3 ) RI TeAt. Th. Checkout 0.157 0.547 0.021 0.075 0.800 
Equipmrent/Spag ecraft Link 
RF Testst" ) Thru Orbiter/ 0.157 0.483 0.021 0.075 0,736 
Spacecraft RF Lank 
IF Teots I Direct With 0.157 0.150 0.OZ 0.075 0.403 
Ground Terminal 
SPACE-BASED TEST 
SEQUENCING 
( 3 ) lF Tests Thr Cheekst 
O234 0.547 01019 0.075 0.875Equipment/Spa cecraft Link 
RF Tests (4 Thr Orbiter/ 
0.234 0.483 0.019 O075 
 0.811
Spacecraft RF Link 

(51 
 RP Tests Di ret With 
Ground Terminal 0.234 0.550 0.019 0.075 0.478 
(1) 	 Two Storrnats assumed launched 
(2) 	 Equipment and software can also be applied to launch site payload testing 
(3) 	 Test of satellite TT&C RF equipment and wideband data system RF equipment
(4) 	 Test of satellite TT&C RF equipment through orbiter link, wideband data system through


checkout equipment link


(5) 	 Test of satellite TT&C EF equipment through orbiter link or directly with the ground


terminus. Wideband data system R. F. link is checked out directly with ground terminal.
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Table 4-3. SMS/GOES Tn-Orbit Checkout Costs 
Per Launch ( ) , $M( 
Equipment and Software(2) 
Spaceborne Equipment 
General Special Ground 
Tests Purpose Purpose Equipment Software Total 
GROUND-BASED TEST 
SEQUENCING 
RX Tests Thru Checkout 
Equipment/Sqpacecrsft Link 0.157 9. I 0.02! 0.050 1.349 
S-Band RF Tests Thru 0.157 0.887 0.021 0050 1.110 
Orbiter/Spacecraft RF Link 
RF Tests Direct With3Ground Terminal( ) 0.157 0.663 0.02! 0.050 0.89! 
SPACE-BASED TEST


SEQUENCING


RF Tests Thru Checkout


Equipnent/Spa c ec raft Link 0.234 I.121 
 0.019 0.050 1.424 
S-Band RF Tests Thru 0.234 0.887 0.019 0.050 1.190 
Orbiter/Spacecraft RF Link 
RF Tests Direct With 3Ground Terminal( ) 0. 4 0.663 0.019 0.050 0.966 
(1) 	 Four SMS/GOES satellites assumed launched 
(2) 	 Equipment and software can also be applied to launch site payload testing 
(3) 	 Data collection system only, Wallops Island ground station outeideof line-of-sight


unless high inclination parking orbit is used.


Table 4-4. Summary of On-Orbit Checkout Cost/Benefit Data 
Upper Stage 	 Coat/Benefit Data Per Flight, $M 
Checkout Cost 
On-Orbit __MaPona ttl 
Satellite Identifi- Checkout Potential 	 Potential ) T 3		 )Project cation Of Stage Sav-ngs(11 mEnt tenance( ) LosS Benefit 
TDS 
Launch I --- --- 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Launch8 .. -.. 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 
STORMSAT IUS No 0.5/0.8(6) 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0.1 
(7 )IUS Yes 0.8/1.2(6) 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 
SMS/GOES IUS No 0.2/0.4(6) 0.9 01 1 0.! -1.0 
(7)  
 
IUS Yes 0.4/0.5(6) 0.9 0.1 0. 1 .7
(8) 
SSUS Yes 0.3/0.4(6) 0.9(7)  0.1 0.1 -0.8


(1) 	 From returning satellites suffering early failures (infant mortality). 
(2) 	 Assunding sequencing of checkout at POCC and RF checkout with ground terminal. This covers 
equipment plus software [DDT&E and procurement (non-recurring) costs). 
(3) 	 Maintenance of checkout equipment. 
(4) 	 Returning good satellites because of false alarm. 
(5) 	 Assume infant mortality split before and after upper stage burn. 
(6) 	 Higher number assumes all satellite infant mortality occurs before upper stage burn; lower number 
assumes an even split before and alter. 
(7) 	 Assumes satellite and upper stage are checked out using same general-purpose equipment. 
(8) 	 Negative benefit reduced (to approximately -0.2M$) if high inclination parking orbit is used. 
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4.2 
inclination is increased so that RF communications between SMS and 
Wallops Island is possible from the parking orbit, (Z) the upper stage is 
checked out on orbit as well as the satellite, and (3) the SIS upper stage 
shares the payload bay with other satellites which are also tested on orbit 
using the multipurpose on-orbit checkout equipment. Even then, the 
economic benefits for SMS/GOES satellite on-orbit checkout are marginal. 
STS ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT STUDY 
Over the past several years, STS ancillary equipment require­
ments have been studied by JSC, KSC, MSFC, and a number of NASA and 
DoD contractors. These studies covered ground support equipment and 
spaceborne equipment. Both program-unique and multi-mission equip­
ment were studied. The mass of information available was organized 
and catalogued into a single document by The Aerospace Corporation. 
4.2.I Objective 
The objective of this study was to provide a current record 
describing what is known about STS ancillary equipments and their current 
status.


Information was drawn from as many sources as possible, but 
no new data was originated. The emphasis is on ancillary equipments 
which could -be applied to more than one STS user's project. 
4. Z.2 Results 
The output of the effort was an Ancillary Equipment Reference 
Data Book. It was designed to (eventually) contain sufficient information 
so that an STS user would be able to evaluate whether the described 
ancillary equipment could be used for a specific project or whether 
payload-unique items would have to be designed and fabricated. 
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4.3 SPACELAB UTILITY FOR DOD 
The Skylab Program demonstrated the unique contributions 
man can make to meet space mission objectives. Throughout the mission, 
man was crucial in assessing and repairing damage, calibrating and 
operating equipment, and obtaining and analyzing data. But for the 
participation of man, few of the objectives of the mission would have 
been realized. 
Manned operations have special significance for future DoD 
research, development, and test space programs which require advanced 
and complex instrumentation and new and untested operational modes. 
4.3.1 Objective 
The objective of this study was to identify and characterize 
specific manned operations which are applicable to DoD space missions. 
4.3.2 Manned Spacelab Activities 
Specific Spacelab manned operations which are applicable 
to DoD space missions are: 
a. Setup and assembly of equipment 
b. Pre-operations tests of experimental equipment 
c. Man/machine interactive operation 
d. Malfunction diagnosis 
e. Maintenance, repair, and instrument modification 
f. Ground/space cooperative tests 
g. Visual observations 
h. Analysis, interpretation, and reduction of data 
i. Test program management and "work around" decision 
making 
j. Recovery of film. 
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4.3.3 Results 
Fifteen Air Force FY 77 Technical Objective Documents (TODs) 
were reviewed during the course of this study in a search for activities 
described by the various laboratories and centers which are or could be 
related to future Spacelab activities. Two activities (shortwave infrared 
interferometer and ultraviolet spectrometer) in the Geophysics Laboratory 
TOD could be Shuttle-attached or Spacelab payloads. It is not surprising 
that only two activities were identified since most of DoD's planning is 
normally done for a five-year period, which ends just about the time Space­
lab flights start. It was found that, in addition to the Air Force Geophysics 
Laboratory, several other laboratories may have requirements for Spacelab 
flight in FY 1982 and beyond if a logical extension of their current activities 
is made. 
The Aerospace task of generating ideas, concepts, and uses of 
Spacelab appropriate for DoD produced potential uses for test and demon­
stration and some concepts for operation uses. This task considered 
longer term DoD needs extending out through the early 1990s. 
The DoD use concepts are summarized in Table 4-5. About 
half of the 17 discipline; areas represented would prefer launches-from 
WTR; other areas are primarily interested in ETR launches. Only a 
relatively small number of uses are identified. However, the results 
should be interpreted in terms of areas of activity, any one of which may 
fly more than one sensor or set of equipment and more than one flight on 
Spacelab. Potential operational uses are listed in the classified appendix 
of report ATR-77(7373-0l)-Z, Spacelab Utility for DoD Final Report 
(Study Z.Z). 
For military terrestrial operations there are testing grounds, 
i. e. , rifle ranges; mortar, bomb, and artillery ranges; road test, off­
road test areas; flight test areas; etc. Spacelab could be very useful to 
the military in this sense as the key element in a low altitude earth orbit 
test range for space-based equipment. 
4-8


--------------------------- -----------------------------
Table 4-5. Spacelab Use Concepts for DoD in the Test and 
Demonstration Area - Summary of Number of Uses 
Number 
of Uses 
Use of NASA Spacelab 9 Facilities are AMPS (possible 
,Facility for DoD FY 79 start), Space Processing 
Experiments (possible FY 80 start). 
Use of Spacelab Primarily 23 Man erects, operates, selects,


Because of Man's Presence coordinates, compares, points,


(Excluding Spacelab conducts surveys, establishes


Facilities Above) 	 patterns, tracks, programs,


monitors.


Use of Spacelab Primarily 9 Many could use Shuttle with or


Because of Shuttle Payload without Spacelab.


Bay Size and Payload Weight


Use of Spacelab Primarily 2 (1) Measurements during orbiter 
Because of its Return reentry. 
Capability (2) Bring back film and recorded 
data. 
Possible Use of Spacelab 23 	 Most economies are expected to 
for "Economic" Reasons 	 be due to man's abilities, return 
and reflight of experiments/in­
struments, elimination of experi­
ment supporting spacecraft. 
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5. 	 TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AND 
NEW OPPORTUNITIES (STUDY 2.3) 
Many space technology programs serve to satisfy both DoD 
and NASA requirements, and it is important to maintain close coordina­
tion between the two government agencies to avoid duplication of effort. 
A detailed DoD technology assessment (up to and including a classification 
of secret) was made by The Aerospace Corporation to determine which 
DoD advanced technology programs have application to NASA needs. 
5.1 OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this study was to survey and assess DoD­
supported technology programs through the year 2000. 
The results enable NASA to review (and possible modify and/or 
enhance) its own future programs in the light of knowledge of DoD programs. 
They also help to reduce duplication of effort between military and civilian 
agencies. 
5.2 SCOPE 
The primary output of the study was an exhaustive collation 
of DoD technology data up to and including a classification of secret, 
covering the fields of strategic and tactical surveillance, navigation, 
meteorology, communications, and various special-purpose space 
applications. A list of the near-term technology programs that were 
covered is given in Table 5-1. Table 5-2 lists the far-term programs. 
Both passive and active sensor systems were considered. The technologies 
covered in these two groups are outlined in Figure 5-1 and 5-Z, respectively. 
5.3 RESULTS 
The trend to increase passive sensor resolution is towards the 
multimega element focal plane array, using advanced CCD (Charge Coupled 
Device) technology. 
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Table 5-1. Near-Term (1975-1985) DoD Technology Programs 
SURVEILLANCE 
" DSP Follow on 
" Optical System Development 
* Focal Plane Development 
a 	 Sensor Concept and Component 
Development 
SPACE SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY 
* Optical Warning Sensor 
* Radiation Sensor 
* Countermeasures 
(Il * Hardened Electronics 
*o Laser Vulnerability and Hardeninga 
* Survivability Satellite Airborne 
Control Facility 
v Satellite Observable CGntrol 
SPACECRAFT SUPPORT AND SYSTEMS 
Improved Solar Cells 
* Secondary Battery
* Fuel Cell 
* Spacecraft Charging (Scatha) 
LWIR 
a CCD at LWIR 
a Low Noise Detector/Amplifier 
a Multi-Band Technology
# Sensor Out-of-FOV Rejection 
S/C GUIDANCE, PROPULSION, 
CONTROL 
* Autonomous Navigation Tech­
nology for Low/High Altitude 
a UV Radiometer 
* Precision Attitude Gyro 
& 	 Electrostatically Suspended
Accelerometer 
COMMUNICATION 
* Laser Communication 
* EHF Communication 
& Narrow Beamwidth 
* Multabeam Antenna 
e Variable Beamwidth Antenna 
* 	 Solid-State Amplifiers and 
Oscillators 
SPACE SURVEILLANCE AND DEFE14SE 
0 Solid-State Detector 
* Cryocooler 
a Satellite Attack Warning
• System Development
* Phenomenology and Advanced 
Technology 
METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY 
METEOROLOGICAL SATLLTETEHNOLOG 
a Cloud Composition Analyzer 
* lonosonde Antenna 
* Microwave Technology
* Sea-State Monitor 
a lonosonde Data Processing 
a Nuclear Survivability 
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND TRANSFER 
* High Speed Data Buffer and processor
* Fault Tolerant Spacecraft Computer 
* 	 Computer Program Verification and 
validation 
* Improved Magnetic Bubble Storage 
a Tape Recorders 
0 
Table 5-2. 	 Far-Term (Through CY Z000) 
Technology Projections 
* 	 Data Rate Projections and Associated Signal Processing/ 
Compression Techniques* 
* 	 -Computer Technology* 
* 	 Software* 
* 	 Visible, NWIR, MWIR, LWIR, FIR Sensor Technology* 
* 	 Cryogenic Cooling* 
* 	 Adaptive Optics* 
* 	 Microwave Sensor Systems and Components* 
• 	 Guidance, Attitude Determination and Control* 
• 	 Material Technology (Contamination Control, Heat Shields, 
Ablation Sensors)* 
Solid-State RF Devices (All Solid-State Radar)*


High Power Microwave Devices (Intense Relativistic Electron
* 
Beam)* 
• 	 Multifunctional Space-Based Radar* 
* 	 Super-Schottky Diode and Low Noise 10-60 GHz Receiver 
* 	 Far-Infrared Heterodyne Radiometer* 
• Far-Infrared Lasers 
* Single and Multiple Resonant Distributed Feedback Semi-
Conductor Laser* 
• 	 Solid-State Space-Based Lasers* 
* Trace 	 Gas Determination 
* 	 Visible Chemical Lasers* 
* 	 Efficient UV Lasers* 
* 	 Millimeter Wave Radiometric Imaging* 
* 	 Mode Locked Lasers (Laser Fusion, Laser Plasma


Diagnostics, X-Ray Laser.)


* 	 GPS Technology (Atomic Clocks, Surface Acoustic Wave


Devices, Null Steering Antennas)


*Techniques are Applicable to Sensor Design and 
Deployment 
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" optical Resolution 	 h] o Halo Sensor 
Advanced DSP" 	 Sensitivity REQUIREMENTS PASSIVE SENSOR SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE 3DS 
" Wavelength Bond TEAL RUBY 
" Stability Of LOS TEAL AMBER 
" 	 Out of FOV Rejection 
SIZE ANDNa 	 CRYOGENICSOETE CTOR ELE MENT SlWAVE LENGTH}H 
16,000 elements per 0. 1 x 0. 1 in. chip (RI Visible VM Refrigerator


Visible 160. 000 elements per chip (TI)SWIR . Stirling Cycle


NWVIR 16, 384 elements per chip (Hughes) LWIR a Rotary Reciprocating


IR * Brayton CycleMFALW
MFPA 	 FIR Stored Coolant 
MATERIAL TECHNOLOGY 	 VULNERABILITY 
Special Composites Hardening of CCD 
- . Heat Shields and Other Solid 
* Mirror SerfaceDeis 
OPTICS 
" 	 Size of Primary Lenas - 30 M 
" Adaptive Optics for Atmospheric 
Penetration, Phase Front Mirror DATA PROCESSING/COMPRESSION COMTAMINATION 
Correcting System Using Electro- a Adaptive Filters CONTROL 
Static Deflection and Activ C*ntre 0 Fault Tolerant Computer * Special Handling 
Syste* . Staie Function Process within * Contamination 
Light Sensitive CCD Chip Sensor 
(Super-chip) 
Attiudeefernce eterinaton ad ControlCOMNATNOHEDTCINPR ESS


Leading to Pointing Accuracy <I s c EHF (0. 1 GUS) * Heterodyne Detection

Laer (1-10 GBPS) * 	 Radiometric Detection 
.		 Super Schottky Diode and 
Lot' Noise Receiver 
Figure 5-1. Passive Sensor Systems and Associated Technology 
REQUIREMENTS ACTIVE SENSOR SYSTEM PERFORMANCE RF 
i-RADAR 
RADARWAEEGHBNDEETR 
Space-Based Radar .3m Pb So TeV-sBbne . 
a RdSWIR . Hg-BandGround-Based Radars MWIR *MI *0-ad *Si:X 	 RF COMPONENTS•Q-Band .g Si T 
LASERS List of Radars: *0.61, 	 * - ­X-Band Small size Ga As COMPONENTS 
ZXYACYAG * 0. 53 $5 iTItA (metal target * . C.-Band Schottky Diode . IREB KLystron.		 .06 P reradiatlon)
VA .0 	 . S'Band *37Super Schottky kW avg power)m~tcd7501 .J UHF (10Ii H ad


CO . 5 P HRRM 
 (high range 
 850 1-10 GHZ band, 
CO 2 p 10.6 1 resolubon radar) 10 ns pulse-width 0 HF * 20.4 W ASMD (antiship o Cyclotron maser 
missile defense) 36-100 CHz) 
COt~p moleculesu ped symmetric SiglbrsLlingle burst LPI 	 100kkW 
(lott probability of


CH3F detection)


CH3OH (369 P/) 

GH3CN 0l. 8 am)m 

CH3 CCH (557 A) 	 SOLID-STATE ACTIVE DETECTION

PROCESSORS
COMPONENTS 
HR 3 350 p 
C F Z.o2mm . TRAPATTS (trapped a Heterodyne detectionH 3 plasma s alanched a Schottky Diode and 
triggered) Ca rcinotron L.O. 
" 	 GaAs/FET . SiX with CO2 L.O. 
* 	 IMPATT (impact 
avalanche transit 
time) 
* 	 Silion Bipolar 
POWER SYSTEM 	 COOLING SYSTEM 
Solar 	 * Stored cryogenic fluid 
Brayton (Nuclear) 	 * Radioactive Coolant 
* 	 Cryo refrigerators (same 
as in passive) 
Figure 5-2. Active Sensor Subsystems and Associated Technology 
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Spectral selectivity can be increased by using acousto-optic and electro­
optic tunable filters. The major trend in active sensors is towards 
adaptive optics enabling large optics (30 to 100 meters) of high figure 
quality to be designed. 
The development of lasers capable of generating lines in the 
20-; to l-mm spectral region and corresponding receivers using Schottky 
barrier diode mixers to achieve high sensitivity over wide bandwidths 
will permit all-weather imaging and communication. Table 5-3 gives the 
characteristics of a multi-line system. Laser and RF radar are expected 
to be viable techniques within a period of 10 to 20 years. 
On-board data processing and data compaction is being actively 
pursued by DoD. Another important area of emphasis is the technology 
associated with achieving accurate attitude reference and Figure 5-3 lists 
the attitude reference requirements for a number of potential DoD future 
mis sions. 
MISSION ORBIT REFERENCE ACCURACY TIME PERIOD 
S-A Sync. Equatorial 5-8 s&c 1980-1985


S-B Sync. Equatorial 0.4-0.6 so. 1980-1985


S-C Sync. Equatorial 0.5-1.5 sic 3980


S-E 1 K n. 7-11 s-c 1980-1985


S-F Sync. Equatorial 0.2-0.4 s'ec 1980-1985


S-G Sync. Equatorial 80-100 .ae 1980-1985


S=H Sync. Equatorial 5-7 sc 1985-1990


C-B 5 X Sync. Equatorial 50-60 sc 1985-1990


C-D Sync. 30 deg Inclined 20-28 sc 1980-1985


C-E Sync. Equatorial 18-20 sec 1980-1985


C-F Sync. Equatorial 2-3 sec 1985-1990


M-C Sync. Equatorial 60-90 src 1980


M-E Sync. Equatorial 1-2 se 1985-1990


M-G Sync. Equatorial 0.02-0.04 s1c 1990-1995


attd compute rADVANCED COMPONENTSgyouoarPrecisio 
Space sextant high . Precison attitude gyros c¢apable of supporting 
altitude navigation and * Electrostatically suspended acceler- multiple navlgatlen*LVdometer subsystemsanattitude reference . UV Radiometer asusyslte sse sor 
.Ysle. a Magnetically suspended reaction wheel associated sensors 
Figure 5-3. High Attitude Reference Technology Programs 
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Table 5-3. LWIR and FIR Imaging Sensor Performance 
narrow beam scanningOPERATION: 	 LWIR and FIR radiation emitted in 
target area in two-dimensional raster: reflected radiation 
impressed upon imaging display. 
0 
10.6 $ Efficient CO 2 with HgCdTe detectors available at 77 K; 
atmospheric turbulence will limit maximum aperture to about 
15 cm; effective in rain (5 dB/nmi; 25 mm/hr; 0. 06 gm/m3 ). 
under 1 km for 	 median fog dropletsHowever, in fog, range is 
 
of -5 A (0. 1 gm/rnm3 density; 50 dB/nrni)


201$: 	 HF laser with Hg0.82 Cd 0 . 1 8 Te detector; less satisfactory 
than the 10. 6 1 system because of increased attenuation in 
clear weather; slightly better ability to penetrate fog but 
range still unsatisfactory 
337p : 	 HCN laser with small area GaAs Schottky diode at room 
temperature; least desirable system because of large atmos­
pheric attenuation; the range is < 1 km even in clear weather 
CH 3 CCH laser 	 and small area Schottky diode; attenuation in7501: 
 
clear weather and fog improves dramatically over 3371$;


same as 10. 61& system in rain


: CzHz F 2 laser and Schottky diode mixer with carcinotron8501 
 
local oscillator can operate in the six bands


1. 	 3 mm: 	 Penetration through clear weather and fog exceedingly good; 
penetration through rain slightly better than 850 A/C 13H 3 F 
laser or small area InSb electron bolometer or small area 
Schottky diode 
CONCLUSIONS: 	 Use multiband system: for rain and snow, the six bands are 
nearly independent of wavelength; the 1. 3 mm system is 
best in fog. 
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6. 	 STANDARDIZATION AND PROGRAM 
PRACTICES ANALYSIS (STUDY 2. 4) 
Program Practices are defined as the non-hardware related 
activities within a project. The activities support the development, pro­
duction and operation of the flight hardware (program management, system 
engineering, quality assurance and testing). This study quantifies such 
activities in order to examine the effectiveness of these accepted practices. 
The effort evaluates each program practice by determining its function, 
effect and cost. These attributes are quantified by examining a large sample 
of spacecraft representing DoD and NASA programs. In .addition to the non­
hardware activities, the study examines the use of previously developed and 
qualified components. 
6.1 OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this study was to assist the NASA Low Cost 
Systems Office to reduce satellite program cost by: (1) the identification of 
cost-effective program practices; and (2) the analysis of the use of previously 
developed programs.


6.2 SCOPE 
The program practices task was performed by: (1) collecting 
spabecraft cost and technical data, (2) reducing and categorizing data into 
a uniform format, and (3) statistically analyzing the data to identify effec­
tive practices. The cost data analysis developed a common work breakdown 
structure (WBS) to assure consistency in content of each program practice 
activity and separated the cost of each program into common WBS categories. 
Adjustments were made for variations in production quantities, program 
start dates and prime contractor scope. 
Technical data were quantified by establishing the complexity 
and program success index. The complexity index consists of an aggregate 
of parameters that, when combined, describe a spacecraft design. Quantified 
parameters with appropriate weightings were summed to derive an aggregate 
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complexity index for each spacecraft program shown in Table 6-1. Program 
success index Was determined for each spacecraft by considering its per­
formance in orbital operation and in meeting planned schedule and cost 
objectives. These performance measures were weighted before they were 
summei to determine an aggregate program success index. Orbital per­
formance was measured by both number and severity of flight anomalies. 
Schedule and cost performance were measured by a ratio of planned to 
actual outcomes. 
Table 6-1. Program Practices Data Base 
FIRST 
PROGRAM AGENCY TYPE MISSION LAUNCH CONTRACTOR 
Pioneer F/G NASA Scientific Jupiter Explorer 1972 TRW 
ATS-F NASA Scientific Communication 1974 Fairchild 
Nimbus E/F NASA Operational Meteorology 1972 GE 
OSO-I NASA Scientific Solar Observ. 1975 Hughes 
ITOS-1 NASA Operational Meteorology 1970 RCA 
SMS NASA Operational Meteorology 1975 Philco Ford 
STP (P7 - I) DoD Scientific Experiments 1972 Boeing 
STP(S-3) DoD Scientific Experiments 1974 Boeing 
DSP Phase I DoD Operational Earth Observ. 1970 TRW 
DSCS II DoD Operational Communication 1971 TRW 
STP (P72-2) DoDl Scientific Experiments 1975 RI 
Cost data, spacecraft complexity indexes and performance 
measures were usbd to identify cost reducing and success improving pro­
gram practices. Linear regression analysis was applied to a sample size 
of eight to nine data points for each program practice to determine the exis­
tence of any correlation. 
Analysis of the use of previously developed components was 
accomplished by: (1) cataloging housekeeping components from DoD, NASA 
and conunercial programs in an equipment compendium, and (2) applying the 
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cataloged components to NASA new starts. The developed components analysis 
was a continuation of work performed over a two-year -span and dealt with 
cataloging qualified components from the 27 current or recent satellite pro­
grams listed in Table 6-a and the analysis of six new starts. 
6.3 RESULTS 
The activities that comprise program practices represent about 
34 percent of spacecraft cost. Spacecraft cost for this analysis is defined as 
total development plus first unit production. The distribution of average cost 
of activities is: 8 percent for program management, 7 percent each for sys­
tem engineering and quality assurance, and 1Z percent for testing. The 
balance (66 percent) is attributable to hardware cost. 
The correlation between spacecraft cost and spacecraft com­
plexity index is shown in Figure 6-1. The upper shaded area encompasses 
all of the NASA and operational DoD programs. The lower shaded area 
covers only DoD space test programs, The cost trend shows thatsubstantial 
savings can be achieved by designing spacecraft for low complexity. Data 
point identifications are deleted from the figure to keep the report non­
proprietary. 
Development phase program management is related to program 
success in Figure 6-2. Increasing management improves program success. 
Data points outside the shaded area of Figure 6-2 are programs having 
special situations, such as a follow-on to an existing spacecraft design or 
an abnormally large amount of subcontracted effort. Program success did 
not correlate during the production phase, which suggests that if production 
management is reduced, there is little likelihood that program success will 
be adversely affected. 
A reduction in flight anomalies was observed with increasing 
quality assurance effort and test thoroughness during the production phase. 
Test thoroughness is an index that reflects the sum of the relative impor­
tance of each phase of a total test progtam, that is, development, qualifi­
cation, acceptance and launch site testing. Flight anomalies also decreased 
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'Table 6-2. Equipment Compendium Data Base 
NASA 
Ni Orbiting Solar Observation OSO-1 
N2 Atmosphere Explorer AE-C 
N3 -Small Astronomy Satellite SAS-C 
N4 Inproved TIROS Operations System ITOS-D 
N5 Synchronous Meteorological Satellite SMS 
N6 Application Technology Satellite ATS-F 
N7 Nimbus F Nim 
Earth Resources Technology Satellite ERTS 
N8 (*) International Ultraviolet Explorer IUE 
N9 (*) High Energy Astronomy Observatory HEAO 
N10(*-) Viking 75 Project Lander MV 75 
Nll(*) - Pioneer F/G 
DoD 
Dl Fleet Satellite Communications FSC 
D2 Space Test Program, Flight 7Z-1 P72-I 
D3 Space Test Program, Flight 72-2 P72-2 
D4 Space Test Program, Flight S3 S3 
D5 Defense Satellite Communication System DSCS-II 
D6 NATO Phase III NATO-Ill 
D7 Defense Meteorological Satellite 
Program, Block 5 DMSP 
D8 Defense Space Program, Model 35 DSP 
D9 Space Test Program, Flight 71-2 P71-2 
D10"(*) NAVSTAR Global Positioning System GPS 
DlI (*) Navy Technology Satellite NTS-Z 
Commercial 
CI(*) Westar 
C2(*) Anik 
C3(*) Intelsat IVA 
C4(*) Comstar 
C5 (*) Geosynchronous Meteorological Satellite GMS 
*Cataloged in FY 76 NASA Study (Contract No. NASW-27Z7) 
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6.4 
with increasing acceptance test cost. In addition, it -was-observed that pro­
grams employing the protoflight test concept produced comparable flight 
performance with programs using the prototype test concept. 
In the 	Equipment Compendium, over 600 developed and quali­
fied components that are producible or available as spares are cataloged.
 
The compendium is designed to provide concise developed components tech­
nical 	 information in one document. Technical information for each compon­
ent consists of key design characteristics, environmental capability, and 
component application. 
The analysis of previously developed components for application 
to new starts indicated that over 50 percent of the components can use units 
listed in the catalog. In order to increase the number of developed com­
ponents, it was necessary to investigate alternative subsystem concepts 
that were used in past spacecraft and, therefore, could use more components 
from 	 the catalog. In the case of the Jupiter Orbiter Probe, the baseline 
Data Handling design is based on microprocessor technology. By employing 
a centralized computer, which is available as standard NASA equipment, the 
use of developed components can be increased from 58 percent to 76 percent. 
Analysis of the Multimission Modular Spacecraft resulted in a similar con­
clusion. The baseline electrical power design is a direct power transfer 
system which charges batteries in parallel and is not the type of power con­
trol that has been widely used on other spacecraft. An alternate design, 
which charges each battery individually, reflects common practice and 
therefore has more components available from the catalog. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Based on empirical and statistical evidence, cost effective 
spacecraft program practices have been identified. Those practices leading 
to improved program success are: 
a. 	 Program Management - Program success improves as the 
relative proportion of total cost devoted to management during 
the development phase is increased. An acceptable range is 
8 to 10 percent of spacecraft cost. 
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b. Quality Assurance - Flight anomalies decrease as spacecraft 
production quality assurance efforts increase. The resources 
applied should be 2 to 4 percent of spacecraft cost. 
c. Acceptance Testing - System acceptance testing is an effective 
way to reduce flight hardware anomalies. Flight anomalies 
decrease as the resources applied to acceptance testing are 
increased. 
The practices that result in cost reduction without affecting 
program success are:


a. 	 Spacecraft Design - Substantial reductions in spacecraft cost 
can be achieved by reducing spacecraft complexity. However, 
payload requirement needs must be analyzed and screened 
to assure that a low complexity spacecraft design will provide 
required capability. 
b. 	 Program Management - Management activities should be 
reduced significantly during the production phase from the 
level used during development to between 2 and 3 percent of 
spacecraft cost. 
c. 	 Protoflight Concept - System qualification tests should be per­
formed on the first flight spacecraft. Flight hardware anomalies 
tend to be associated with the prototype concept. 
d. 	 Developed Component - Use of developed components should 
be encouraged. The equipment compendium provides a stan­
dard reference source of DoD and NASA developed components. 
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7.1 
7. INTEGRATED STS OPERATIONS 
PLANNING (STUDY 2.5) 
The STS offers a unique capability for exploiting the benefits 
of space, and its effective use is an important consideration in any future 
planning of STS operations. It is therefore important to consider the 
options available to manage this resource for the benefit of all users. 
It is assumed that NASA will retain its management responsi­
bility for STS through.the developmental period and subsequent transition 
to steady-state operations. It is the next step that is of interest: estab­
lishment of an operational management concept that best achieves the 
overall program objectives. An assessment of the operational maanage­
ment options was made by The Aerospace Corporation. 
OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this study was to develop a technique for 
assessing the merits of each STS operational management option relative 
to a complete option set. 
The problem is complex and typical of issues that must be 
resolved by top level management. The decision process involves values 
of the decision maker that are not always obvious to others. These values 
may also change quite rapidly (depending on such factors as the prevailing 
political environment) and therefore the decision process is, under most 
conditions, very subjective. In spite of this, the decision process visi­
bility must be maintained along with consistency in ranking the various 
options. Also it is desirable to provide, to the greatest extent possible, 
a quantifiable measure of the likes and dislikes of the decision maker. 
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7.2 MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 
Seven candidate management options were identified and their 
primary characteristics are listed in Table 7-1. Assessment of the options 
requires consideration of the principal parties involved in STS operations 
viz; NASA, DoD, and Congress, and also of the STS program objectives 
interpreted as:


a. 	 Reduce cost of future space operations by more efficient 
use of resources. 
b. 	 Expand horizons to include larger segment of society and 
generate potential for increased public benefits. 
c. 	 Provide capability to stay at the forefront of space ex­

ploration and maintain leadership in the field.


d. 	 Support international policies and goals by cooperation in the 
peaceful use of space. 
Table 7-1. Management Alternatives 
STS MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS 	 PRINCIPLE FEATURES 
EASE REDUCED RESPONSE RESPONSE 
OPTIONS DEFINITION OF AVAILABLE NASA TO NAT'L TO 
TRANSITION RESOURCES BURDEN EMERGENCY USERS 
(CURRENT) * 	 FROM R&D TO-OPERATIONAL1.NASA 	 EVOLVES 

ORGANIZATION 

2. NASA (MODIFIED) * SEPARATE STS OPERATIONS DIVISION 	 " 
3 NASA - CONTRACTORIOPERATOR * 	 SMALL NASA MANAGEMENT ,


ORGANIZATION - CONTRACTOR


OPERATES STS SYSTEM


-4 NASAIDoD * MANAGEMENT BOARD WITH SHARED 
OPERATIONS RESPONSIBILITY 
5. SEPARATE 	 AGENCY * NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION 	 9' 
AGENCY


6. COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS - "A" * AMTRAK QUASI-PUBLIC AGENCY 	 , 
7. COMMERCIAL OPERATIONS - "B" * COMSAT QUASI-PUBLIC AGENCY 	 ' , 
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7.3 	 RESULTS


The values used in the assessment were established by a


NASA study team. The analysis was performed by The Aerospace 
Corporation. Intuitive feelings toiards a given option are not necessarily 
borne out by analysis, as outlined in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-2. 	 Intuitive vs. Counter Intuitive Findings 
INTUITIVE OPTION COUNTERIINTUITIVE 
" HIGHLY QUALIFIED AND f NASA ICURRENT * BURDEN ONNASA BUDGETSAND 
MOTIVATED ORGANIZATIONS tNASA (MOD IFIEDI MANPOWER 
. DILUTES R&D EFFORTS 
. TOP HEAVY ORGANIZATION 
* LOSS OFCONTROL NASA-CONTRACOR 6 RETAINS POLICY RESPONSIBIITIES 
" INEFFICIENT OPERATIONS 	 * PROFIT MOTIVE INCREASES RESPONSE 
TO USERS
 

" EQUAL RESPONSIBILITIES NASA-DOD * CUMBERSOME ORGANIZATION UNDER 
* NASA BUDGET 	 MOST SCENARIOSRELIEF[ 
&UNORIENTED TOPROGRAM OBJCTIVES 
" DEDICATED TO PROGRAM SEPARATE AGENCY] * CONGRESSIONAL PREFERENCE ISTO 
OBJECTIVES I RESTRAIN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 
INVESTMENT tO GREAT TO I COMMERCIAL "A"AMTRAK }* PROFIT MOTIVE LEADS TO INCREASED 
HAND OVERTO PRIVATE COMMERCIAL "B"COMSAT EFFICIENCY FOR ALL USERS 
ENTERPRISE 	 .'OPERATIONS vs DEVELOPMENT 
The results 	 of the analysis indicate that Option 3 (NASA­
Contractor/Operator) isthe preferred approach. However, it is not possible


to rationalize the significance of this choice without a quantitative ranking


of the remaining options. The ranking is shown in Figure 7-1 for five 
different scenarios where the maximum achievable value is 1000 points. 
The NASA personnel who participated in the final evaluation 
are listed in Table 7-3. In each instance the participant was expected to 
express what was best for the program, not what was best for NASA, or 
DoD, or any other agency. The most significant result is 'that a strong 
preference exists within NASA middle management to minimize the involve­
ment of NASA in day-to-day operations while still retaining executive manage­
ment control. 
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Figure 7-1. Study Results 
Table 7-3. Participating NASA Personnel 
NASA

Participant Position

(Judge)

C. M. Lee 	 Director - STS Operations 
R. 0. Aller 	 Dep. Director- STS Operations 
J. M. Smith 	 Study Director - Phase I 
R. F. Heuser 	 Study Director - Phase II 
M. S. Malkin 	 Director - Space Shuttle 
D. R. Lord 	 Director - Spacelab 
W. 	 C. Schneider Dep. Assoc. Adm. -

Office of Space Flight
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7.4 CONCLUSION 
Ranking of the seven management concepts occurs in two dis­
tinct groups for each of the five scenarios. The first group consists of 
Options 3, 6, and 7. 
Although Option 3 consistently ranks first, the point spread is 
sufficiently small that discrimination between the three concepts is difficult 
Without further work. The following summarizes the value judgments 
expressed by those participating in the assessment process: 
a. NASA should utilize its resources for research and 
scientific endeavors and minimize the burden of routine 
operational support. 
b. Selection of any one of the three highest ranking options 
represents a rational compromise for supporting DoD 
operations. NASA would not be directly involved with 
classified operations. 
c. The profit motive is a strong incentive to achieve efficient 
operations and reduce user costs. 
d. The profit motive provides an inducement to treat users 
in a fair and impartial manner, since loss of a customer 
immediately reflects loss of revenue and profit. 
e. The profit motive enhances the competitive posture of 
STS operations relative to terrestrial alternatives. 
f. The three preferred concepts are less sensitive to annual 
budget fluctuations and therefore could effectively provide 
continuity of planning and comnitments. 
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8.1 
8. 	 SPINNING SOLID UPPER STAGE (SSUS) FOR 
DELTA AND ATLAS/CENTAUR CLASS MISSIONS 
(STUDY Z. 6) 
The spin-stabilized Shuttle upper stage was proposed in 
1974 and resulted in an Aerospace Corporation and a Hughes Aircraft 
study in FY 75. These studies addressed the feasibility of spin stabilizing 
a stage deployed from the Orbiter. Various methods of obtaining the 
stabilization, injection accuracy, satellite modifications, and design 
characteristics associated with the use of a spin-stabilized stage were 
examined. 
It was 	 concluded that the SSUS concept was feasible and appeared 
to be a 	 cost-effective alternative to the interim upper stage (IUS) and to the 
full capability Tug, particularly for the Delta and Atlas/Centaur class 
missions which represent a high proportion of the NASA and comntmercial 
satellite traffic. More detailed analysis was recommended and The 
Aerospace Corporation was contracted to conduct a follow-on effort with 
emphasis on the Delta and Atlas/Centaur class missions. 
OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of this study were: 
a. 	 Provide planning data to support NASA feasibility


and economic assessment of the SSUS


b. 	 Recommend the most promising SSUS concept for


Delta and Atlas/Centaur class payloads


c. 	 Define the potential economic and technical advan­

tages of having the SSUS augment the IUS system


d. 	 Establish the SSUS relationship to the IUS system/


components with emphasis on commonality


e. 	 Determine the major impacts on spacecraft programs


that utilize the SSUS


f. 	 Provide an early assessment (75 days) of an Intelsat V 
SSUS system. 
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8.2 RESULTS 
The SSUS concepts which resulted from the study are illustrated 
in Figures 8-1 (a) and 8-1 (b). They both utilize single solid rocket perigee 
kick motors (PKM), one of about 3300-kg mass for the Atlas/Centaur class 
and one .of about 1630-kg mass for the Delta class. These motors, with 
attached spacecraft and SSUS subsystems, are spin stabilized to a maximum 
of 60 and 100 rpm, respectively, using a tilting spin table driven by redun­
dant electric motors. The same spin table was used for both concepts. 
The satellite, SSUS, and spin table are mounted on a one-piece cradle 
having two attach points on each Orbiter longeron and a single keel fitting 
attachment. The SSUS-A (Atlas/Centaur class) mounts a single system 
in the cradle while the SSUS-D (Delta class) mounts two systems (one 
above the other on the cradle). 
A single cylindrical structure of aluminum skin and stringer 
construction surrounds the SRM and interfaces with the spin table and 
spacecraft. The cradle mating trunnions and other subsystems are mounted 
on this structure. Avionics consist of a redundant sequence timer, batteries, 
separation systems, and an ANG (active nutation control - kitable option) 
system. The stage mechanical system consists of a small GNZ sphere, 
regulator, control valve, and nozzle for the ANC and a YO-weight destabil­
ization system. The ANC system is a necessary option kit for spacecraft 
having high energy dissipation rates and consequently high nutation during 
the coast period prior to SSUS motor firing, while the YO-weight device 
is used to destabilize the burnt out SSUS after spacecraft separation. 
SSUS injection accuracy studies for both SSUS-A and -D 
indicated final orbit injection accuracies [ after spacecraft apogee kick 
motor (AKM) burn out] equivalent to present Atlas/Centaur and Delta 
experience. Pointing errors during the AKM burn are determined by the 
satellite, while those during the SSUS PKIVI burn are determined by the 
Orbiter pointing of the SSUS cradle and SSUS stability during coast after 
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Figure 8-1. Spinning Solid Upper Stage/Spacecraft System 
8-3 
deployment. Studies of the Orbiter pointing indicated that a-s long as a 
maximum 2-deg error in Orbiter payload bay to Orbiter navigation base 
alignment is achieved excellent accuracy is achievable. Greater errors 
could require an auxiliary star tracker mounted on the SSUS cradle. 
The two SSUS designs provide interfaces which exactly duplicate 
the standard Atlas/Centaur and Delta interfaces. The SSUS interfaces 
with the Orbiter are limited to the cradle mechanical attachments, simple 
electrical controls for elevating and powering the spin table motors, and 
a minimum electric power and monitoring interface with the SSUS. No 
fluid connections are required. The SSUS sequence timer system is 
initiated by the Orbiter-generated separation signal routed through re­
dundant SSUS separation switches on the spin table interface. 
For the contamination levels assumed, safe separation distances 
of approximately 7 km for SSUS-A and 4. Z km for SSUS-D with angles of 
25-30 deg between the Orbiter slant range vector and the plume axis are 
required. These distances can be achieved in 1/2 revolution of the paiking 
operation (45-main coast) with a 0. 3-mps SSUS separation velocity and 
additional Orbiter velocity maneuvering of about 0. 5 mps. The sequence 
timer primary timing signal thus consists of a 45-min SSUS separation to 
SlM firing signal interval. This time becomes an important parameter 
for nutation studies, ANC, and operational timelines. Operations both 
in flight and on the ground were found to be very simple and low cost. 
The SSUS study resulted in sufficient information to permit 
bypassing a Phase A definition contract and direct committal to Phase B 
hardware development. However, several space system contractors have 
offered to develop and build the SSUS as commercially funded ventures. 
Currently, both the McDonnell Douglas Corporation and the Boeing Company 
have signed agreements with NASA on the terms of such developments. 
The first 75 days of the SSUS study were directed at achieving 
a detailed preliminary design suitable for the Intelsat V communication 
8-4


8.3 
satellite. This goal was achieved and the Comsat Corporation and Intelsat 
Consortium subsequently committed the Intelsat V spacecraft to transition 
from the Atlas/Centaur expendable launch vehicle to the STS using the SSUS-A. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The study achieved its objectives and surpassed the expectations 
of the study team by clearly identifying two simple, low cost, highly reliable 
upper stage systems for the STS. NASA mission model capture analyses 
resulted in 173 SSUS flights and 19 IUS missions (16 escape missions) for the 
1980-1991 time period. The SSUS system is ideally suited to the transition 
of Delta and Atlas/Centaur class satellites from expendable launch vehicles 
to the STS with minimum technical risk and cost impact. 
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9. 	 INTEGRATED PLANNING SUPPORT 
FUNCTIONS (STUDY 2. 7) 
A large number of space initiative concepts have been identified 
in the recent past. Though their general impact on needed transportation 
and support vehicles is understood, additional and specific planning informa­
tion on the earliest need dates for each type of initiative is needed. 
9.1 	 OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this study was to define requirements for space 
transportation and orbital support facilities based on time-phased develop­
ment plan milestone data generated for logically grouped sets of initiative 
system concepts. The data were to be prepared in a form suitable for 
NASA to use in defining programs in space industrialization. At least 
two alternative program plan options were to be treated and the categories 
of space processing, communication, and space power included as a 
minimum. 
9. 	 Z APPROACH 
All the initiatives identified in previous studies were grouped 
into the eleven functional groups listed in Table 9-1 to enable a time­
phased development to be generated for each functional grouping. Examples 
of the time-phased developments for three of the groupings are given in 
Figures 9-1, 9-2,and 9-3. The corresponding time-phased needs for trans­
portation and orbital support facilities were then identified for each group 
and examined to derive the study output. The study output includes: (1) 
the earliest date on which a support element is needed; (2) identification 
of those initiative groupings which would require a Space Construction Base 
or other permanent manned facility as opposed to Sortie operations sup­
ported by the Shuttle; and (3) identification of those initiative groupings 
which would require more advanced transportation systems and support 
facilities. 
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Figure 9-1. 	 Development Plan, Group 1 Initiatives 
(Public Service Platforms Using 
Microwave Multibeam Antennas) 
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9.3 RESULTS 
The study resulted in two forms of study output. The first, 
illustrated in 	 Figures 9-4 and 9-5, presents two extremes of the earliest 
needs for transportation and support. Figure 9-4 represents the condi­
tion where all space initiative areas are developed except the Satellite 
Power Station (SPS) and very large space radars, and none are carried 
beyond the demonstration phase. Figure 9-5 represents the condition 
where all initiatives (including the large, high power devices) are developed 
and operated. 
Figures 9-4 and 9-5 indicate that the need for large boosters, 
very large OTVs, and some full capability space facilities is dependent 

on very large scale projects such as the SPS. However, the need for 

laboratories, manned habitats, medium capability and low thrust OTVs, 

test/start up/ assembly/servicing devices, and some space facilities is 
'independent of any decisions made concerning the SPS. 
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Figure 9-4. 	 Composite Plan - Earliest Needs for 
Transportation and Support (Alternative #6) 
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The second form of display is illustrated in Figures 9-6, 9-7, 
and 9-8. Four levels of increasing capability are postulated, as shown 
in Figure 9-6. The earliest time at which each level is required by 
various space initiative groups is shown in Figure 9-7 for development 
and demonstration programs only, and in Figure 9-8 for development, 
demonstration, and operational programs. The figures indicate that: 
(1) the planetary programs require the earliest augmentation of the 
Shuttle/Spacelab/IUS combination, (Z) all programs require such aug­
mentation in the mid-1980s, (3) large OTVs, early permanent facilities, 
and manned habitats will be needed around 1990, and (4) large boosters 
and large permanent facilities are needed by operational large informa­
tion and energy systems in the 1995 time period (but only by the energy 
system if demonstration is the only goal). 
9-5


TRANSPORTATIONe 
SUPPORT 
GROUPS 19 
INFORMATION 
PROCESSING 
ENERGY 
SCIENCE 
PLANETARY 
FUNCTION 
Low OrbittBoost 
eOrbit Transfer/Esca 
Fabnicatson, Assembly, 
 
Test, Start Up.

Servicing in Orbit 
Processing Factories 
HbttEarly.Habiti 
Figure 9-6. 
1
i985 
ShuttleV 
Large Votume-Shottle - Dsrn-sd­
Unm~anned 
Heavy Lift - Manned/Unmanned 
SrnallSOOO0 lb is CEO)
-Unmarried, Chen..1 
Medium (10-15,000 lb in CEO) 
Low Thrust, Crew Modules 
Optional 
Large (15-60,000 lbIn CEO) 
Low Thrust, Crew ModulesOptional 
Huge 10D,000 lIb in GEO)/ 
Low Thrust, Crew Modules 
Optional 
lis Capability of Shut, 
Specialsaed Device/Vcbicle/Suia 
Dedicated Early, Msomal
Facility, 
Warehouse Full 
Use of Spaelab 
Dedicated Early, Minimal 
Facility Full 
minimal 
Capability Levels 
1990 
CAPABILITY LEVEU1 1 I V[ 
/ 
/7 .. 
V t, 
/ 7 57. 
-
1/ 
/ 
- , 4 4/ 
7 j 
1995 2000 
Figure 9-7. 	 Approximate Earliest Capability Needs, 
Development and Demonstration Programs 
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9.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The following general conclusions may be drawn: 
a. 	 Except for some planetary missions, Shuttle, IUS, and Skvlab 
will support most initiatives through the mid-1990s, and 
many through the early 1990s. 
b. 	 Larger OTVs (chemical and low thrust), specialized vehicles 
and devices for orbital fabrication, assembly, test, start up 
and servicing, and crew capsules for manned operations will 
be required, beginning in the mid-to-late 1980s. 
It must be noted that many of the specific transportation and support devices 
are clearly impacted by questions such as manned versus automated versus 
teleoperator operations, assembly in GEO versus LEO, orbital fabrication 
versus use of large-volume payload boosters, etc., which were outside the 
scope of this 	 study. 
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c. 	 Shuttle-derived unmanned boosters designed for large volume, 
low density payloads, even larger OTVs (chemical and low 
thrust), early minimal dedicated facilities for warehousing, 
fabrication, assembly, test, start up, servicing, and crew 
capsules and habitats will be required, beginning in the late 
1980s 	 or early 1990s. 
d. 	 A new heavy lift booster (manned and unmanned), huge OTVs, 
and full, manned facilities for warehousing, fabrication, 
assembly, test, start up, and servicing will be required, 
beginning in the mid-1990s. However, these requirements 
are dependent on the pursuit of very large scale projects such 
as energy elivery or distribution and the larger space radars. 
e. 	 Space fabrication, assembly, and servicing are needed by 
most of the initiatives in their fully evolved form, but many 
early demonstrations do not require such capability. 
f. 	 Shuttle-derived advanced boosters should strive for two options: 
one with much larger payload volume, rather than larger pay­
load weight, and a second option which maximizes weight. 
g. 	 If a balanced and ambitious program is followed in all other 
areas of space activity, all but the largest of the transportation 
and orbital support needs in the 1990s are independent of any 
decisions made on the SPS. 
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